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Abstract
We modify the provision point mechanism by introducing reward money, which
is distributed among the contributors in proportion to their contributions only
when the provision point is not reached. In equilibrium, the provision point is
always reached as competition for reward money and preference for the public good
induce su¢ cient contributions. In environments without aggregate uncertainty,
the mechanism not only ensures allocative e¢ ciency but also distributional. At a
specic level of reward money, there is a unique equilibrium, where all consumers
contribute the same proportion of their private valuations. The advantages of the
mechanism are also demonstrated for collective action problems.
Keywords: Public goods; private provision; provision point mechanism; aggregative
game; distributional e¢ ciency; collective action problem JEL codes: C72, D82, H41.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we propose a new mechanism for the provision of threshold public goods.
It is an extension of the provision point mechanism with refunds by an additional clause.
The clause species a sum of reward money to be distributed among the contributors in
proportion to their contributions if the sum of contributions is below the provision point.
I would like to thank James Andreoni, Dirk Bergemann, Nick Netzer, and Rakesh Vohra for helpful
discussions and comments.
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Hence, in the event of insu¢ cient contributions each contributor gets his contribution
refunded and, additionally, a share of the promised reward money. But the distribution
of reward money never occurs in equilibrium. When provision is su¢ ciently desirable
by agents, competition for reward money and preference for the public good induce
contributions up to the level where the provision point is reached. Importantly, this
mechanism not only resolves the free-riding problem but can also implement the public
good in the unique Nash equilibrium.
In equilibria, obtained under the proposed mechanism, every consumer receives a
payo¤ from the public good at least as high as that from the share of the reward money
assigned to him if he deviates. Therefore, the e¤ect of the introduction of reward money
is a reduction of the set of individually rational strategies that can be supported in
equilibrium. A higher level of reward money implies a smaller set of equilibrium strategies.
In environments without aggregate uncertainty about the total value of the public good,
the mechanism can uniquely implement the project with reward money set at the net
value of the public good. In environments with aggregate uncertainty, the mechanism also
results in the only equilibrium outcome of provision without dispensing reward money as
long as the public good is su¢ ciently e¢ cient, but otherwise there is no equilibrium.
The aforementioned unique implementation achieved with the reward money set at
the net value of the public good has a special feature. Every consumer contributes the
same proportion of his valuation, where the proportion is equal to the ratio of the cost of
the public good and its total value. Therefore, the mechanism ensures not only allocative
but also distributional e¢ ciency. Taken from a di¤erent perspective, the mechanism
e¤ectively levies a Lindahl tax and can be expressed as a demand to pay a proportional tax
on the private valuation for the public good. The reward money ensures that consumers
have the right incentives to reveal their privately known valuations truthfully.
The problem of underprovision and, relatedly, of free riding arises when externalities
are not internalized. Reward money can be viewed as a device to compensate consumers
for externalities they create. For the same reason, we argue that the suggested mecha-
nism can prove useful in other situations where the problem that externalities are not
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internalized arises. Specically, we demonstrate this on a collective action problem, where
participation in a project is individually rational only when a critical mass of participants
is reached. Reward money e¤ectively eliminates undesirable equilibria leaving only the
e¢ cient one, which, by design, does not lead to the distribution of reward money. More-
over, the mechanism implements the e¢ cient outcome in weakly dominant strategies. In
the case of negative externalities, e.g., the problem of the commons, the mechanism fails
to achieve the e¢ cient outcome without distributing reward money. The reason is that
the e¢ cient outcome is not individually rational with negative externalities unlike in the
case with positive externalities.
Generally, the idea behind our mechanism relates to the augmented revelation prin-
ciple of Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1990) (also see Ma et al. (1988)). They show that
the revelation principle augmented with specially designed transfer payments eliminates
the undesirable equilibria produced by the direct mechanism. At the same time, as in our
mechanism, transfer payments are never paid in equilibrium. Taken from this more gen-
eral perspective, our mechanism when equivalently reformulated as a direct mechanism
can be seen as a practically applicable example of the augmented revelation principle.
The literature on the private provision of public goods and, specically, on the provi-
sion point mechanism is immense to be discussed in any greater detail here. The provision
point mechanism with refunds has a practical appeal as it is simple for implementation.
It was successfully applied by Benjamin Franklin in the 18th century and is presently
used in online donation platforms. This mechanism is formally introduced and analyzed
in Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) (see Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984) for a discrete version).
They show that under complete information it uniquely implements the e¢ cient outcome
in undominated perfect equilibrium, but it certainly gives rise to a multiplicity of Nash
equilibria including ine¢ cient ones. Experimental studies reveal that this mechanism
implements the public good in about 50 percent of cases (Isaac et al. (1989), Cadsby
and Maynes (1999), Marks and Croson (1999)) but the problem of free riding is sizable
(see Ledyard (1995) and Chen (2008) for reviews). In the eld, the implementation rate
is much lower (Rose et al. (2002)). With the introduction of seed money, i.e., signicant
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rst-move donations, the e¢ ciency of the provision point mechanism improves (List and
Lucking-Reiley (2002)), but a multiplicity of equilibria, including free riding, is still a
problem (Andreoni (1998)). Attempts are made to improve the performance of the pro-
vision point mechanism by introducing di¤erent rebate rules of contributions exceeding
the provision point such as proportional rebate, winner-takes-all, etc. For experimental
evidence, see Marks and Croson (1998), Rondeau et al. (1999), Spencer et al. (2009),
who show improvements in allocative e¢ ciency, but there are concerns regarding dis-
tributional e¢ ciency. All this calls for further e¤ort on improving the provision point
mechanism.
The idea to reward the contributors in the event of insu¢ cient contributions is not
new. Tabarrok (1998) applies it to the problem where agents have a binary choice of
making or not making a pre-determined contribution toward the public good which is then
provided conditional on a su¢ cient number of contributors. He proposes an assurance
contract that implements the public good project in dominant strategies.1 The contract
species a reward that each contributor receives in case the number of contributors misses
the target needed for implementation. With such a reward, like in the present paper, the
mechanism designer can e¤ectively and at no cost eliminate ine¢ cient outcomes. The
present paper extends this idea by allowing agents to contribute any amount toward the
public good and also applies it to other problems with positive externalities. But the main
advantage of our mechanism with continuous contributions lies in its superior properties
of distributional e¢ ciency, as it can induce agents to make contributions in proportion
to their valuation for the public good. For a similar reason, our mechanism can also be
applied in environments with very uneven distributions of private valuations, where xed
contributions may be restrictive in raising su¢ cient funds.
Generally, this paper belongs to the strand of literature on public good games with re-
wards to contributors. Falkinger (1996) proposes a mechanism that rewards contributors
with above-average contributions. Morgan (2000) studies the mechanism that induces
contributions with the help of lotteries. Goeree et al. (2005) demonstrate the advantages
1I thank Ted Bergstrom for bringing my attention to this work.
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of the all-pay auction design in soliciting contributions. For experimental evidence on
the performance of these mechanisms, see Falkinger et al. (2000), Morgan and Sefton
(2000), Lange et al. (2007), and Corazzini (2010), who all report improved allocative
e¢ ciency. However, distributional e¢ ciency may be failed. In the case of the lottery
mechanism, it can happen (and it is empirically supported, see Kearney (2005)) that it is
poorer people who end up nancing the public good, i.e., lotteries are regressive. Morgan
(2000) points out that adverse distributional e¤ects may override allocative gains, leaving
this problem open. The same applies to the mechanisms of Falkinger (1996) and Goeree
et al. (2005). Lastly, the mechanisms that reward contributors, discussed above, lead
to the distribution of promised rewards in equilibrium, which is not the case with the
mechanism proposed in the current paper.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After introducing a set-up in
Section 2, we study the performance of the mechanism in two di¤erent environments: (i)
without aggregate uncertainty (Section 3) and (ii) with aggregate uncertainty (Section
4). Section 5 deals with an application of the proposed mechanism to a collective action
problem. The last section concludes the study.
2 Set-up
There is an economy that consists of a set N = f1; :::; ng of consumers with quasi-linear
utility functions
Ui = wi + vih(C): (1)
In (1), wi denotes the wealth of consumer i in the numeraire good, and vih(C) denotes
his utility from the public good in the amount of C provided. The public good cannot
be provided in amounts below a threshold of Cmin > 0. The function h(C) is strictly
increasing and concave, h0(:) > 0 and h00(:) < 0. Privately known valuation vi takes
values in a compact set V  R+; a vector of valuations v = (v1; :::; vn) is drawn from a
distribution F (:) with the support Vn. The public good is provided by transforming the
numeraire good into C on a one-for-one basis. We assume that the marginal utility of the
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public good, vih0(C), is smaller than 1 for every i so that no consumer nds it individually
benecial to increase the amount of the public good already provided. Throughout the
paper, wealth constraints are assumed to be non-binding for all consumers.
In the economy, there is a public authority that seeks to implement the public good
project of a given size C. The authority has a capacity to raise a budget of at most
B, which is, however, insu¢ cient to provide the public good in any amount, i.e., B <
Cmin. To raise the required funds C, the authority turns to the public with the following
mechanism. Consumers are asked to make voluntary contributions toward the public
good. Let g = (g1; :::; gn) 2 Rn+ denote a prole of their contributions and G the sum of
contributions. If G  C, the public good is nanced out of the contributions collected,
with the excess amount G C wasted (assumed for the ease of exposition). If G < C, the
public good is not provided, the contributions are refunded, and the authority distributes
an ex-ante promised level of reward money R among the consumers in proportion to their
contributions.
For brevity, we label the mechanism by its amount of reward money, R. Until further
notice, we shall ignore the constraint that R  B and assume that the authority can
credibly promise any level of reward money R. For ease of exposition, we normalize
h(C) = 1 so that vi denotes consumer is willingness to pay for the public good C. The
payo¤ to consumer i under a mechanism R is given by
i(gi; G) =
8><>: I(G  C) [vi   gi] + I(G < C)
hgi
G
R
i
if G > 0
0 if G = 0;
(2)
where I(:) is an index function.
The game induced by a mechanism R is aggregative: A consumers payo¤ depends
on own contribution and the sum of all contributions. We apply techniques developed
to study aggregative games which simplify our analysis greatly.2 In the next section, we
analyze the mechanism in environments without uncertainty about the total value of the
public good. Specically, letting V (v) denote the sum of the components of the vector v,
2See Jensen (2010), Martimort and Stole (2011), Martimort and Stole (2012). For an application
toward public good games, see Cornes and Hartley (2007).
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we impose on the support of F (:) a property such that V (v) is the same for each v. Later,
we study the problem with aggregate uncertainty, in doing which we also generalize our
results obtained for the case without aggregate uncertainty.
3 No Aggregate Uncertainty
Here, we study the situation when the total value of the public good project can be
estimated without knowing the exact valuations of consumers. When the number of
consumers is large then, by the law of large numbers, the total value of the public good
can be approximated by V (ve), where ve is the expected vector of valuations under the
distribution F (:). But even without reversion to the law of large numbers, one can think
of situations where the total value of the project is known. For instance, the total value
of, e.g., a park, can be inferred from expected price changes of the nearby property.3 The
rest of the incomplete-information framework is retained.
Assumption 1 V (v) = V for each v and is publicly known.
We assume that consumers choose contributions (without randomizing) that consti-
tute a Nash equilibrium of the game induced by a mechanism R. Letting G i denote the
sum of all contributions of consumers other than i, we dene
Denition 1 A prole of contributions g is a Nash equilibrium if gi maximizes i given
G i for each i 2 N .
Next, given Assumption 1, we characterize the set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria,
denoted by  (R), under a mechanism R > 0. In the proof, we rely on the aggregative
structure of the game, which allows us to study it as a two-player game between an
individual consumer and the aggregateof other consumers.
Proposition 1 If 0 < R  V   C, then  (R) =
n
g : 8i; gi  CR+C vi;
P
jgj = C
o
. If
R > V   C, then  (R) = f;g. If R0 > R, then  (R0)   (R).
3The assumption of the known sum of private characteristics is not uncommon in economic modeling.
E.g., Bergstrom and Varian (1985) present a general result; Marks and Croson (1999) discuss it in
relationship to the performance of the provision point mechanism.
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Proof. When R > 0, there is no equilibrium g such that jgj < C as any consumer could
obtain a larger share of the reward money R by marginally increasing his contribution.
Similarly, jgj > C cannot hold in equilibrium as any consumer could gain in utility by
marginally decreasing his contribution. Thus, the equilibrium candidates need to have
jgj = C. For every i 2 N , let eG i denote the total amount consumer i believes to be
contributed by others. Consumer i contributes gi = maxf0; C   eG ig to have the public
good provided if eG i  C   C
R + C
vi: (3)
This condition follows from the individual rationality condition vi   gi  giCR, where the
right-hand side is the upper-bound utility of the consumer when he contributes marginally
less than needed to have the public good provided. The largest individually rational
contribution leading to the provision of the public good is given for every i by
gi  C
R + C
vi: (4)
Summing up (4) we see that the public good can be provided in equilibrium only if
C + R  V . Next, we check the consistency of beliefs in (3). From (4) we see that
it is rational to expect eG i  CR+Cj 6=ivj = CR+C (V   vi). It immediately follows that
beliefs in (3) are consistent also if C + R  V . Thus, if R  V   C, then  (R) =n
g : 8i; gi  CR+C vi;
P
jgj = C
o
. But if R > V  C then  (R) = f;g because the largest
amount raised in the individually rational way is lower than C. The last part of the
proposition follows from the observation that if (4) holds for R0 it also holds for R < R0.
But the reverse is not true. Hence,  (R0)   (R).
With a promise to reward the contributors in the event the provision point is not
reached, the mechanism actually induces a su¢ cient amount of contributions for the
public good to be provided. The reason is that when R  V   C there is always a
consumer willing to increase his contribution to have either a larger share of the reward
money or the public good provided. From a di¤erent perspective, in the game induced by
the mechanism the consumers need to decide which prizeto divide, the reward money
8
R or the net utility of the public good V   C, and they choose whichever is bigger.
Therefore, if V   C  R, then they choose the public good and otherwise the reward
money. In the latter scenario, there is no equilibrium because the set of contributions
that sum to less than R is not compact. (With a discrete contribution space, R > V  C
would result in the equilibrium outcome jgj = C   , where  is the smallest currency
unit.)
In equilibrium, each consumer needs to obtain a utility level from the public good at
least as high as that obtained from the share of the reward money the consumer is entitled
to if he deviates. A higher level of reward money implies a more protable deviation and,
thus, a higher level of utility for each consumer in equilibrium, which reduces the set
of equilibria. But if the promised amount is too generous, it makes consumers seek
utility from the reward money rather than from the public good. Interestingly, when
reward money is set at the net value, R = V  C, the mechanism implements the public
good in the unique equilibrium.4 This equilibrium has a special feature that all consumers
contribute the same proportion of their private valuations, gi = CV vi. Hence, the ratioC=V
can be interpreted as a voluntary Lindahl tax, levied on consumersprivate valuations for
the public good. Thus, the mechanism with R = V  C achieves distributional e¢ ciency.
Discussion
Even though reward money is never distributed in equilibrium, the capacity of raising it
needs to be credible. There are several possible sources of reward money, the simplest of
which is seed money generated from individual donors. If the source of reward money is
the budget of the authority, then it has to be that R  B, restricting the set of feasible
mechanisms. And if unique implementation is a desirable property, then this constraint
on reward money can be binding for public good projects of large size. Under this
circumstance, the public authority would have to either reduce the amount of the public
4Formally, the uniqueness result can be explained by the fact that at the equilibrium point of provision
the payo¤ function  of each consumer is continuous and concave in own contribution. At the same time,
we have a multiplicity of equilibria with R < V   C because of the discontinuity of payo¤ functions i
at the point of provision, but these functions are upper semicontinuous. But if R > V   C, then at the
point of provision the upper semi-continuity of at least one payo¤ function i is violated, which is behind
the non-existence of equilibria.
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good sought in order to preserve uniqueness or proceed without unique implementation.
If the authority raises its budget through taxes imposed on consumers, then there
is also a question when the promised reward money needs to be raised: before the an-
nouncement of the fund-raising campaign or after it. It is important because the timing
of taxation can have an e¤ect on consumer payo¤s in (2). To illustrate our argument,
suppose that the authority can levy a lump-sum tax  = R=N from every consumer. Be-
cause of quasi-linear preferences, ex-ante taxation has no e¤ect on consumer preferences
for the public good. Therefore, Proposition 1 continues to hold in its entirety.5
Ex-post taxation, however, implies a change in consumer payo¤s in (2) as the sec-
ond term becomes I(G < C) gi
G
R  . Analogously to (4), the individually rational
contribution has to satisfy
gi  C
R + C
(vi + ): (5)
Thus, the upper bound on individually rational contributions increases with ex-post tax-
ation. The reason is that, when the provision point is reached, the consumer also avoids
paying the tax, making his gain from the public good vi +  rather than vi. But for the
same reason, however, with ex-post taxation we can obtain equilibria with contributions
larger than valuations. Consumers with vi < CN may pledge contributions above their val-
uations to increase the likelihood of reaching the provision point done to avoid the tax.
Finally, with ex-post taxation the existence of equilibria is independent of the condition
R  V  C as potential gains from reward money are diminished by taxes. The outcome
of the unique equilibrium is, accordingly, not preserved. Despite these disadvantages,
ex-post taxation has an advantage that it is reverted to only in the non-equilibrium event
of the distribution of reward money, whereas with ex-ante taxation the cost of raising
taxes needs to be incurred immediately.
It is also worthwhile to discuss the negative side of the mechanism, which is the bad
non-equilibrium outcome, when the promised reward money needs to be distributed. It
hardly has any impact on the social welfare (none, in fact, with quasi-linear preferences).
5If the authority sets the provision point at C   R rather than at C, supplying the remaining funds
from tax revenues when the provision point is reached, then we have the public good provided whenever
V  C (i.e., independently of R) and, correspondingly, a multiplicity of equilibria.
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On the individual level, the badoutcome is not, however, without an element of justice.
Unlike in the typical scenario of the private provision of public goods, the mechanism with
reward money leaves free-riders worse o¤ than contributors, who then can be thought of
as receiving a compensation for the public good being not provided in proportion to
their revealed preference for it.
4 Aggregate Uncertainty
In the previous section, the mechanism with reward money is analyzed under the assump-
tion of no aggregate uncertainty, which we relax here. Without the structure imposed
by Assumption 1 the simple characterization of equilibria given in Proposition 1 may
no longer hold. The consistency of beliefs about the sum of contributions collected by
others can be infringed if the condition V  R + C is not met. Certainly, if for every
possible vector of valuations v we still have that V (v)  R + C, then Proposition 1
continues to hold. As we show next, however, if in the support there is a vector v such
that V (v) < R + C, then there is no equilibrium.
Formally, let each consumer i choose a strategy gi : V ! [0; C], which is a mapping
from own valuation vi 2 V to contributions. Denote by G(v) the resultant sum of
contributions at vector v when a strategy prole g is played. Consumer is expected
payo¤ is given by
i(gi; G) =
Z
I(G(v)  C) [vi   gi(vi)] + I(G(v) < C)

gi(vi)
G(v)
R

dF (v) (6)
Let g be an equilibrium prole. In this equilibrium (as in any other), by the principle of
aggregate concurrence6 all consumers must agree on the choice of the aggregate G

(v).
If we replace gi(vi) in (6) with G(v) G(v) + gi (vi), then for each i the following needs
to hold
G
 2 arg max
GG i
i(G G + gi ; G); (7)
6See Martimort and Stole (2011) and Martimort and Stole (2012), on which the following analysis is
based.
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where G

 i(v) is the sum of equilibrium contributions of consumers other than i.
We can also observe that the game is aggregate-invariant: The total welfare of con-
sumers with uniform weights is invariant to the composition of individual contributions
as long as their sum is the same. This observation simplies the search of the equilibrium
aggregate G

. Dene the total welfare by
(G;G

) =
1
n
X
i2N
i(G G + gi ; G)
=
1
n
Z
I(G(v)  C)
h
V (v)  (nG(v)  (n  1)G(v))
i
+
I(G(v) < C)
"
nG(v)  (n  1)G(v)
G(v)
R
#
dF (v): (8)
Then, for each i we have in equilibrium
G
 2 arg max
GG i
(G;G

): (9)
Proposition 2 The game induced by a mechanism R has no equilibrium if V (v) < R+C
for some v.
Proof. First, we show that G

(v) = C for all v such that V (v)  R + C. If for some
v we have G

(v) > C, then a consumer with a non-zero contribution can increase his
welfare and, in fact, the total welfare by choosing G(v) = G

(v)   " > C. Thus, the
maximum amount contributed in equilibrium must be C. Now, consider a vector v such
that G

(v) = C. It has to be that at v every consumer i nds that the sum G

(v) = C
leads to a higher welfare than G(v) = C   " for any " > 0. Using (8), this implies
V (v)  C  C   n"
C   " R: (10)
As the right-hand side is at most R for any " > 0, we get that in equilibrium G

(v) = C
only if V (v)  R+C. Analogously, we can establish that if V (v) < R+C thenG(v) = C
cannot hold as it is consumer welfare improving to have a lower G(v). But because the
integrand of (8) is not continuous from the left (and not upper semicontinuous) at v with
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R > V (v)  C, there is no such G(v) that consumers could agree upon.
The proof of Proposition 2 o¤ers an alternative proof of Proposition 1 and it formalizes
the earlier claim that Proposition 1 continues to hold if V (v)  R + C for each v.
The intuition behind the result of Proposition 2 is straightforward. In their attempt
to maximize own welfare, the consumers want to have the highest total payo¤ for each
realization of v. For low realizations such that R > V (v) C, the consumers rather divide
the reward money, which leads to the no equilibrium outcome. As a simple example
illustrating the proposition, consider a setting with C = 50, n = 2, where v1 = 40 but v2
takes a value of either 0 or 40 with equal probability. Suppose the authority applies the
mechanism with R = 20. In equilibrium, we should have g1(40) + g

2(40) = 50. But the
optimal contribution g2(0) needs to be as close as possible to but less than 50   g1(40),
which is not possible given a continuous contribution space.
In environments with aggregate uncertainty, welfare implications from the proposed
mechanism are harder to assess as the provision of the public good is not always in equi-
librium. The expected welfare depends on the likelihood that the project is su¢ ciently
e¢ cient. But as before, in comparison to the standard provision point mechanism with
refunds, a signicant advantage of the mechanism with reward money is the elimination
of the zero-contribution equilibrium.7
Individual contributing behavior
Next, we study individual contributing behavior by looking at the best-response contri-
bution of consumer i with valuation vi, denoted by gBRi (R; vi), given a mechanism R and
any strategy prole of others g i (not necessarily equilibrium). Specically, interest lies
with the comparative statics of the best response with respect to R. As only the aggre-
gate contribution of others matters for consumer i in deciding on own contribution, we
let G(:) be the distribution of the sum G i of other contributions resulting from g i and
assume the di¤erentiable probability density function (:) > 0 and a compact support.
7In an experimental study, Marks and Croson (1999) show that with uncertainty the e¢ ciency rate of
the provision point mechanism remains similar to that obtained for the case without uncertainty, which
is about 50 percent.
13
The best response of consumer i maximizes his expected payo¤ and is given by
gBRi (R; vi) = argmax
g
(1  G(C   g))(vi   g) +
Z C g
0
(G i)
g
G i + g
RdG i: (11)
Above, 1  G(C   g) stands for the probability that the provision point is reached when
the consumer contributes g, and the second term stands for the expected share of the
reward money when the provision point is not reached. The expected payo¤ on the right-
hand side of (11), dened as a function ei(g;R; vi), is not super- or sub-modular in g and
R in a general case, which implies a non-trivial comparative statics of gBRi (R; vi) with
respect to R. Intuitively, an increase in R gives rise to two countervailing e¤ects. First,
an increase in contribution raises the probability of the provision point being reached and,
accordingly, lowers the probability of obtaining a share of the reward money. Second,
an increase in contribution raises the expected share of the reward money. Assuming
the validity of the rst-order approach, i.e., @2ei=@g2 < 0, we can establish the following
result.
Proposition 3 Assume that the elasticity of density (:) is less than 1 and gBRi (min(V); R) =
0. There is a threshold valuation vi 2 V such that for R0 > R we have
gBRi (vi; R
0) S gBRi (vi; R) if vi T vi. (12)
Proof. By the implicit function theorem and suppressing the arguments, we have
dgBRi
dR
=
@2ei=@g@R
 @2ei=@g2 : (13)
The sign of this expression coincides with that of the numerator. The cross derivative
@2ei
@g@R
=  (C   gBRi )
gBRi
C
+
Z G gBRi
0
(G i)
G i
(G i + gBRi )2
dG i (14)
is strictly decreasing in gBRi because of the assumption about the elasticity of (:). Thus,
this derivative can only cross zero from the left. If it never crosses zero, then we have
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@2ei=@g@R > 0 (by continuity and the fact that it is positive at gBRi (min(V); R) = 0),
given which the proposition trivially holds with vi = max(V). Now, denote the point
where the derivative crosses zero by g0. Observing that the best response gBRi (R; vi) is
increasing in vi, dene vi = max(vi 2 V : gBRi (R; vi)  g0). Then, if vi  vi we have
@2ei=@g@R  0, and vice versa, which proves the proposition.
In words, Proposition 3 says that low-valuation consumers are likely to increase and
high-valuation consumers to decrease their contributions when more reward money is
o¤ered, keeping the behavior of others constant (or assuming that the aggregate e¤ect of
changes of their behavior is of a second order, e.g., the elasticity of density (:) remains to
be less than 1). Consumers with higher valuations and, accordingly, higher contributions
are entitled to larger shares of the reward money. Thus, an increase in reward money
makes them more seek utility from the reward money, which they attempt by diminishing
the probability of provision with lower contributions. This e¤ect is weaker for consumers
with low contributions, who rather increase their shares of the reward money with higher
contributions. O¤ the equilibrium path, it is hard to predict the aggregate e¤ect, but it
has to be zero in equilibrium.
5 Collective Action Problem
In the private provision of public goods, the purpose of reward money can also be viewed
as a way to compensate consumers for externalities they create. The problem that exter-
nalities are not internalized arises in many di¤erent situations hindering the achievement
of socially optimal outcomes. Next, we apply our mechanism to one such situation, specif-
ically, a collective action problem, where participation in a project is individually rational
only when a critical mass of participants is reached (see Myatt and Wallace (2009) for a
recent discussion on collective action problems).
Imagine a government that plans to populate a new area with a capacity of at most
M settlers. The individual cost of settling in this area is xed at c, whereas the benet,
denoted by v(m), depends on the total number of settlers,m. Let the benet be increasing
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in m implying positive externalities from settlement. Assume that it is individually
rational to settle in the area only if there are at least m   1 other settlers, where m =
minfm : v(m)  cg and let 1 < m < M . There is a large population of people who
simultaneously decide whether to le an application for a settlement. Applications are
contractually binding and in case more than M applications are led, M of them are
randomly selected. As v(1) < c, we can have two equilibrium outcomes (i) bad 
nobody settles and (ii) goodthere are M settlers.
A much applied way to eliminate the bad equilibrium in similar problems is via
subsidies. In our example, the government can o¤er m  1 subsidies of size s, which are
randomly distributed if there are more than m 1 applications. However, for the subsidy
scheme to eliminate completely the badequilibrium it has to be that s = c  v(1) with
the total budget of (m  1)(c  v(1)) required. Now suppose that the government applies
a mechanism with reward money. The government announces that if the number of
settlers is smaller than m then the settlers equally share a pre-specied endowment of R;
ifm  m then no money from the government is distributed. Obviously, for R su¢ ciently
large the only equilibrium outcome is when there are M settlers. The threshold R such
that with R > R there is only goodequilibrium is determined by
R = max
mm 1
m(c  v(m)): (15)
To see this, if R  c   v(1) then there will be at least one settler, if R  maxfc  
v(1); 2(c v(2))g at least two, if R  maxfc v(1); 2(c v(2)); 3(c v(3))g at least three,
and so on until we establish (15).
Unlike in the case of subsidies, no money is distributed in equilibrium under the
mechanism with reward money. Furthermore, as R < (m   1)(c   v(1)) the budget at
stake is lower than that with subsidies. The mechanism with reward money compensates
settlers for the externalities they create as long as the critical mass is not attained (after
which externalities play no important role). Moreover, it is straightforward to see that
the promise of reward money R > R has an implication that ling an application is a
weakly dominant strategy.
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An interesting question is whether similar e¤ects can be achieved when the mechanism
is applied to problems with negative externalities, e.g., the problem of the commons. The
answer, however, is no. The mechanism with reward money is designed in such a way that
the events of distribution of reward money and of achievement of the social optimum are
exclusive. In the case with positive externalities, the social optimum is also individually
optimal, i.e., is a Nash equilibrium, but it is not in the case with negative externalities.
Therefore, it is impossible to achieve the social optimum without the distribution of
reward money.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a modication of the provision point mechanism with refunds
that leads to signicant improvements in performance. The modication is reward money
introduced to benet contributors in case the provision point is not reached. In environ-
ments without aggregate uncertainty the proposed mechanism leads to the unique e¢ cient
outcome without dispensing the reward money. Moreover, the mechanism with the re-
ward money set at the net value of the public good implements the e¢ cient outcome
uniquely with every consumer contributing the same proportion of his private valuation.
Thus, the proposed mechanism not only achieves allocative e¢ ciency but also distribu-
tional. In environments with aggregate uncertainty, the unique equilibrium outcome is
also the provision of the public good as long as the project is su¢ ciently e¢ cient. We also
apply the mechanism to a collective action problem and show that it can implement the
e¢ cient outcome in weakly dominant strategies. Lastly, this mechanism remains fairly
simple for the purpose of practical applications.
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